Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies:
"The Continental Origins of Postmodernism"

Week 5: October 11-October 17

William Dale Reviews Michel Foucault's "History of Sexuality, Volume I"

Sent: Sunday, October 17, 1999 10:17 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: WD Foucault Review

[Here is the first Foucault review essay. Hopefully we will get back on
schedule as the week unfolds. -Moderator]

Foucault's Sexuality
William Dale

Brief History of Foucault

As I understand it, Foucault is one of the widely recognized creators of
post-modernism. He was influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche, and he retains
Hegel's concern with a combination of both philosophical and historical
theorizing. In particular, two elements were of primary interest to
Foucault: the understand the relationship of general history to the
philosophical history, and understanding humans as epistemological beings.
He rejects from this same tradition, the idea of history having an orderly,
logical progression and "meaning" as well as the idea of a science (or set
of sciences) about human nature.

Foucault wrote about the intellectual uses of certain words over various
historical periods on particular themes such as medicine, penal practice,
psychiatry, and sexual conduct. He likes to discuss the "historical
constructs" through which we come to view various ideas over time, and to
describe the power relations and social norms which he believes define such
terms over time.

Prof. Hicks includes Foucault among the four philosophers included in his
definition of Post-Modernism as a philosophy characterized by metaphysical
antirealism, epistemological collective subjectivism, social constructionism
in human nature, and value collectivism. Following a summary reading, I
will use this proposed definition to see if the material permits the
inclusion of Foucault in the proposed definition.

The caveat I offer for the reader is that I had a difficult time
understanding this text, and I suspect my difficulties will be evident. It
was frustrating for me to try to empathize with Foucault's conceptual
distinctions because I couldn't identify entities to be included in many of
the concepts he offers. I felt as if the terms being used were words I
recognized, but the underlying conceptual distinctions being made were
utterly alien to me. I was left simply quoting in much of what follows and
offering speculative comments on what the quoted material might mean. I
offer sympathy to the readers for the following summary and analysis as I
struggled to be objective in my reading of Foucault.

Introduction

Foucault begins by contrasting our current "Victorian Regime" toward
sexuality, which has reigned since the beginning of the 17th century, and
the formerly open regime prior to then. This prudish Victorianism treats
sex as "restrained" and "hypocritical," and it labels all sexual activity
outside of a married, heterosexual couple's bedroom characterized by being
related to reproduction, silence, and monogamy to be abnormal. Other sexual
practices are consigned via repression to "the brothel" or to mental
hospitals. They are given "a sentence to disappear," as well as an
"injunction to silence" and an "affirmation of non-existence." Only in
their permitted realms, they are given, "a right to...forms of reality" and
a "clandestine, circumscribed, and coded type of discourse." Thus, Foucault
presents the essence of his analysis to follow: a discussion of the history
of sexuality to highlight the relationships between sex, repression, power,
and knowledge.

According to Foucault, one of the first, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to
liberate humanity from sexual oppression came from Freud and his
introduction of psychoanalysis. However, this liberation was an illusory
one because is was "medicalized" and therefore implicitly accepting of the
repressive order through relegating the subject of sexuality to a safe
discourse--sanitized science. This relegation failed to address the
"fundamental link" between power, knowledge and sexuality. Truth, Foucault
suggests, is inextricably tied to politics, and Freud fails to address this
in his scientific analysis of sexuality. In Foucault's words, "the least
glimmer of truth is conditioned by politics." Foucault moves quickly to
politics by linking the repression of sexuality to capitalism, calling this
repression an "integral part of" capitalism which is asserting its ugly head
at the time of the rise of Victorianism. Exploited workers can't be allowed
to have pleasure except in the service of reproduction.

One possible source for the link of sex and power via repression might be
the "speaker's benefit" provided. This is because speaking about the
prohibited, i.e. unacceptable sexuality, is a disruption of the established
order and challenging the power implied by the repression. An implicit
support for the established, repressive order comes from those wishing to
have a voice of opposition within it. But Foucault discounts this idea.
Instead, he suggests that a discourse on sexuality linked to power via
repression is characterized by: 1) truth revelation, 2) overturning of
global laws, 3) the proclamation of a new day, and 4) a promise of felicity.

Following this prelude describing the current situation, Foucault presents
his purpose in this discourse on the history of sexuality. He intends to
present a means or method for examining the discourse on sexuality. In
particular, he wants to understand why contemporary society feels so
guilt-ridden over making so much of the discourse about sexuality "a sin."
He is setting out to "examine...a society castigating itself for
hypocrisy," a society that "speaks verbosely of its own silence," that
"relate(s) in detail the things it doesn't say," that "denounces the power
it exercises," and promises liberation from laws making it function." He is
not interested in the repression of sexuality, he is interested in the
protest about that repression.

He quickly considers, and rejects, the "repressive hypothesis" that the loud
protesting is a result of the difficulty entailed in overthrowing the
established, stifling, reigning order. His three-fold objections are
formulated as questions. First: Is sexual repression an established
historical fact? Second: Is power and its mechanisms really repressive?
Third: Is the "critical discourse" of repression really an example of the
"power mechanism" or "historical framework" it claims to denounce?
Foucault, perhaps oddly, is not interested in answering these questions.
Instead, the objections are to serve as a means for focusing the discussion,
for reorienting the debate, a debate he intends "putting back within a
general economy of discourses on sex." He wants to "define the regime of
power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality" and
the understand "the way in which sex is 'put into discourse'".

Objective

In this section, Foucault sets the stage for offering his "analytics of
power." He does this by exposing what he sees as the conventional account
of power, a flawed account he exposes in order to dismiss it in favor of his
own alternative. He first asserts that, contrary to the usual account,
power is not repressive in nature, it is not used as an outside force or
authority which restricts the expression of "primal urges" of sexuality from
the outside. Rather, he invokes a "theory of desire" which says any time
desire is present (presumably including sexual desire) the "power relation
is already present." Thus, power relations are inexorably tied to any
discourse on desire/sexuality. How is it so tied?

Power should be understood through an "analytics" which define "the domain
formed by relations of power," and Foucault offers to elucidate the
"instruments" that make this analysis possible. That will have to wait
until the next section. First, he insists on the importance of rejecting
the idea of power of the "juridico-discursive" type. He rejects the usual
conception of power as manifest in the laws of society written up as the
legal code. This usual conception has at least five features, and these
features can be understood by applying them to the case of sex. First, the
"negative relation" in which it "negates" sex if and when sex might be
enacted. Second, the "insistence of the rule" in which power dictates an
order to sex via language--i.e. the dictate of a (prohibitive) legal code of
restrictions. Third, the "cycle of prohibition" in which sex is forced to
"renounce itself" through either self-abnegation or via explicit external
suppression. Fourth, the "logic of censorship" in which (unacceptable) sex
is not permitted, it's expression is prevented, and it's existence is
denied. Finally, the "uniformity" of power--that it has a general character
that functions equally in all situations involving power relations with only
variation in the scale of its strength. This general character is the "law
of transgression and punishment." Foucault summarizes the conception he
opposes as relying on "the force of the negative" and "nothing more than the
statement of the law and the operation of taboos," and he explicitly rejects
the appropriateness of the "rule of law."

Foucault then tries to account for the widespread appearance of power in
this form he rejects. The reason for its success is a tactical one--because
it is general in operation and silent in expression, it's true nature as an
oppressive force is hidden. The establishment of this "discourse," this
juridico-political power manifest in legislation, hid the operation of the
true underlying "facts and procedures of power." In doing so, true power
was consolidated behind the scenes. Despite efforts to separate executive
power (i.e. "monarchy") from judicial power, they remained tightly bound
together--as they must, Foucault insists. Critics have been unable to
change this state of affairs precisely because they accept the impossible
separation as a worthy goal. Not to despair. Modern society has developed
new "power mechanisms" not captured by this standard model. If we can now
discard the notion of "power-law," we can understand the working of power in
society, which is the subject of the next section.

Method

Foucault says power is "the name [of a] complex strategical situation in a
particular society" which is exemplified by the "multiplicity of force
relations in the sphere in which they operate." This multiplicity is
"coded" in two forms: war and politics. To understand the difference of
this conception from the one he opposes, he offers a series of contrasts.
Power is not a thing to be obtained and/or manipulated; instead, it is the
interplay of complex relationships. Power is not a simple separation of
binary relationships into the controller and the controlee; instead, they
relationships which are part of other relationships such as economic,
knowledge, and sexual relationships. Power is not a "top-down" phenomenon
emanating from those above and dictating to those below; instead, they are
manifest throughout society.

He further characterizes power relations as intentional, but nonsubjective.
While they are intentional in being directed in a particular "direction,"
they are not the intention of individual people. In this way, they are like
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" or Hayek's notion of the coordination of the
market through human action, but not by human design. Furthermore, the
"points of resistance" in the network of power relations are also
everywhere, like resistors in a large electric panel.

This characterization of power as a flux of shifting relations between
spheres of force and resistance is the sought for "escape" from the judicial
model of power. In understanding the history of the discourse on sex, one
is to apply this conception to find the power relations that influence the
discourse. In doing so, there are four "rules" to be followed. The rule of
immanence directs one of search for the shifting forces allowing an inquiry
to take place. In any subject of inquiry, including sexuality, one must
seek the relations of power which permit the subject to be opened as an
object of inquiry. The rule of continual variations seeks for patterns of
shifting forces (i.e. "matrices of transformations") within the discourse,
rather than "static" relationships. The rule of "double conditioning"
admits there are complicated, but reinforcing, relationships between small,
local power centers in the flux and the more global strategies and power
relations. Finally, there is the rule of tactical polyvalence of
discourses, in which any discourse must be conceived as a involved in many
different of the constantly shifting force relations.

Applying these rules requires two standards for evaluating any discourse,
including one into sexuality. The first standard is tactical
productivity--what are the effects of the discourse on power and knowledge
in society. The second is strategic integration--what force relationships
make the use of the discursive elements necessary in any given instance.

Foucault intends to use these rules and standards to evaluate the discourse
on sexuality since the 17th century. Having laid this groundwork, he's
ready to present his analysis of the relevant discourse about sex, power,
and knowledge.

Domain

Foucault begins his "analytics" with a description/definition of sexuality
as "a dense transfer point for relations of power...endowed with the
greatest instrumentality" and a "linchpin for the most varied strategies."
To interpret this a bit, he seems to be distancing his discussion from a
reference to biological and psychological phenomena such as drives and
centering it on the discourse of sexuality over time. This discourse forms
the metaphysical ground from which "sexuality" emerges as an important
location for the interplay of power and knowledge. "Sexuality" is an arena
for the playing out of power and knowledge relationships among multiple
actors.

Four "strategic unities" emerge from the two century discourse on sexuality
according to Foucault. These unities formed "mechanisms" within the flux of
power and knowledge. These unities "gained an effectiveness" in power
relations and showed "productivity" in knowledge relations, thereby becoming
the "privileged objects of knowledge." The unities each have a prototype
representative--1) The hysterical woman, 2) the masturbating child, 3) the
Malthusian couple, and 4) the perverse adult.

The Hysterical Woman is manifest in discourse in three ways. The first is
as a body "saturated with sexuality," or what today might be called the
"objectification" of the female body. The second is "medical pathology,"
in which medicine incorporated women into practice for conditions
"intrinsic" to it; Foucault doesn't say, but I assume he means the
development of fields like gynecology and obstetrics. The third is an
"organic communication" into the "social body" via fecundity, the "family
space," and the life of children.

The Masturbating Child enters discourse in a complicated way via two
opposing forces. The first is the "natural" indulgence of children in
sexual practices (presumably like masturbation), or at least the desire to
so indulge. This is considered "unnatural" and therefore dangerous for
these "pre-sexual" beings. Given this conflict between two contrary forces,
there is a focus on controlling them by multiple actors such as parents and
doctors.

The Malthusian couple also lies at the center of multiple forces, this time
of "socialization." There are fiscal/economic pressures to limit one's
sexuality to a monogamous, heterosexual relationship. There is the
political "responsibilization" for birth control, perhaps as evidenced by
China's policies to limit couples to one child if possible. There is the
medical socialization which places "pathogenic value" on birth control, thus
discouraging population growth.

Finally, there is the Perverse Adult, created through the identification of
a "sexual instinct" with biological and psychiatric components. Various
"abnormalities" of sexuality were clinically isolated, and thus made open to
(medical) treatment(s), primarily psychoanalysis.

But why these unities and not others? The issue, Foucault suggests, is
"the...production of sexuality." This production is generated by the
discourses of the time period analyzed, and the discourse is governed by the
power and knowledge structures of that time period. Those structures which
gain strength in the ebb and flux of multiple forces attain significance,
and sexuality is one of these constructions. Sexuality is "the name...given
to a historical construct." This construct, as identified by the "unities"
described above, is described/defined as:

"...a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the
intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of
special knowledges, and the strengthening of controls and resistances, are
linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of
knowledge and power."

The construct continues to evolve, gradually replacing an older order with
the new one. The previous order, was an order characterized by: 1) a system
of marriage and kinship ties, 2) the transmission of names and possessions,
3) and containing rules defining acceptable sexual behavior mostly to
maintain reproduction. This order, the "deployment of alliance", lost
strength to economic and political forces and was superseded by a new
apparatus, the "deployment of sexuality." This new order, in contrast,
"exists to proliferate, innovate, annex, create, and penetrate bodies in a
detailed way" and for "controlling populations is a comprehensive way."
This is not a hostile takeover of one culture by another, rather it is the
evolution of one "alliance" or comprehensive strategy out of a former one.
The new order operates through the "family cell" via the twin axes of
husband-wife and parents-children, and it's role is to "anchor" sexuality
and provide support for it.

Through the remainder of the essay, Foucault describes the evolution of the
new sexuality out of the older order of alliance. He describes a
"deployment" of sexuality. As the older, restrictive order attempted to
suppress the emerging sexuality, a number of unfortunate conflicts arose
within the cultural focus point, the family, resulting in the colorful
emergence of, "the nervous woman, the frigid wife, the indifferent
mother--or worse, the mother beset by murderous obsessions--the impotent,
sadistic, perverse husband, the hysterical or neurasthenic girl, and the
young homosexual who rejects marriage or neglects his wife." To control the
"saturating sexuality" invading the family, it turned to medicine and was
rewarded with psychoanalysis via Charcot and Freud.

Final Brief Thoughts

First, a psycho-epistemological gestalt on the reading. Foucault is an
entertaining, sensually engaging writer. The images of the hysterical woman
and perverse husband caught in the vortex of societal forces beyond their
understanding or control, or of a Faustian sexuality running rampant through
the repressive Victorian society and demanding medical attention to subdue
it was entertaining and fun. Amazingly, he combines these vivid,
metaphorical characters with an image of a deeply mechanistic view of the
world, particularly its human actors. The recurring themes are about
impersonal, physics-like "forces" such as "power" and "knowledge" which
"operate" throughout society. These forces, having a kind of Will of their
own, shift about, creating confluences and resistive points, acting via
individuals and institutions which are passive bodies being pushed and
pulled through history. Understanding these "forces" seems to entail
interpreting the "discourses" evident in a society, and it is these
expressive, discursive elements which form the most basic material from
which social life emerges.

Returning to Prof. Hicks' definition of post-modernism, does Foucault fit?

In metaphysics, PM is exemplified by antirealism. I'm not sure, based on
the above, what sort of metaphysics Foucault would endorse. It seems that
he believes in "discourse" as the basic material of life. To understand
sexuality, one does not start by observing human beings and comprehending
human nature in creating a theory of sexuality. Instead, one looks at the
"forces" which dictate the discourse on sexuality in a particular historical
context. I don't think that the "discourse" is to be seen as a means for
understanding human nature; Foucault doesn't see human nature as the issue.
Instead, the discourse is the basic material out of which the important
"forces" in society emerge to effect the course of events. It seems to me
this acceptance of "discourse" is, in Objectivist terms, an example of the
primacy of consciousness rather than the primacy of existence metaphysics.

In epistemology, PM accepts a collective subjectivism according to Prof.
Hicks. Foucault would seem to fit comfortably into this category. He
relies on the socio-historical agreement on terms as the standard for
epistemology, rather than focusing on the individual conceptualization of
percepts into concepts. "Sexuality" has shifting meaning over time, a
meaning that is completely dependent on the discourse from that time and
place. This shift can not be understood as right or wrong, I don't believe,
depending on how accurately a phenomenon is characterized. Rather, there is
no right or wrong outside the agreement at the time of the accepted meaning.
He endorses the idea that truth depends importantly on power, with avenues
of knowledge only attainable with the "permission" of authority. I find it
nearly impossible to try and reduce Foucault's elaborate descriptions of his
key terms such as sexuality into perceptible concretes; they exist, in
Objectivist terms, as floating abstractions which he doesn't try to ground
in perception. Of course, I don't believe such an identification is of
concern to Foucault--that's not his standard for truth.

In the realm of human nature, PM accepts social constructionism, and
Foucault is an exemplar of this. People as individual actors are basically
irrelevant to Foucault; the "forces" acting in a society act through people,
but the people themselves are not actors. The clearest expression of the
social constructionism in Foucault are his striking prototypes for the
"unities" in society; these vivid characters are built by the "alliances"
acting on them.

Finally, in the realm of values, PM endorses value collectivism, Prof. Hicks
says. I'm not sure if Foucault fits here, only because I don't know what
his ethical-political positions would be based on this writing. The one
thing he clearly rejects is the "rule of law" in some form. He sees the
"judicial" view of power, as exemplified by legislation, as wrongheaded and
dangerous. It's "prohibitive" character is antithetical to a proper
understanding of power, an understanding based on the it's permeating all
aspects of society as a universal force like gravitation.


Sources

Michael Foucault. The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction.
Translated by Robert Hurley, Vintage/Random, 1980. Part One, "We 'Other
Victorians,'" pp. 3-13; Part Four, Chapters 1-3, pp. 81-114.

Hicks S. Defining Post-Modernism. Fall 1999 CyberSeminar in Objectivist
Studies, Oct. 5, 1999.

Urmson JO, Ree J. The concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and
Philosophers, 3rd Edition, 1989.


----William Dale



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Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

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